With the fresh news of a compromise in the Linux Mint distribution images, I thought I would take a few minutes to explain how Fedora handles image downloads and what you can do as an end user to make sure you have the correct and official Fedora images. First, lets take a look at what happens in each step if you open your browser to getfedora.org (our install images download site):

• You type 'getfedora.org' in your browser.
• First, your operating system asks your dns servers for the IP address of getfedora.org. If your OS is using dnssec, then it will get a cryptographically signed answer. If not, it will get whatever answer your dns servers give it.
• Next your browser may try and connect to getfedora.org via http. We have getfedora.org setup to redirect all http requests to https, so this would get you a redirect.
• On the first https connection to getfedora.org, we send a HSTS header. This tells your browser (if supported by it) that it should ALWAYS use https to talk to this site. Even if you enter http://getfedora.org, it would just correct that and connect on https.
• Once connected you can download distro images by clicking on the download link for the image you like. Once you click on a download (unless you have completely disabled javascript), there's a screen describing how to verify your download: https://getfedora.org/verify
• Once you have downloaded your image, you need to do two things to make sure it's the valid and official image: First, check the gpg signature of the checksum file. Official checksum files in Fedora are always signed. You can get the gpg key for that Fedora release from getfedora.org, most any keyserver, or from the fedora-repos package if you already have a Fedora install. Additionally, if you import this key and then refresh (gpg2 --refresh-keys) you can see the signatories of that key and decide based on all that if you trust it. If thats correct, then you can use sha256sum to check the checksum of the image. YOU SHOULD ALWAYS DO THESE CHECKS. :)

So, we have dnssec, hsts and signed checksum files. Would that have helped us any if we suffered a attack similar to the one the Linux Mint folks suffered? In that attack, their download machines were compromised and intruders replaced checksum and download links to their own version. If that happened to Fedora, the only step above that would protect people would have been the gpg signature check (which sadly, many folks never do, and for good reason, it's hard and anoying and manual). In Fedora 24 the workstation and server editions will be moving to preferring the usb media creator application instead of preferring direct downloads of images. We will need to make sure it's as secure as we can make it, but there may well be a manual step of checking the application after you download it. (Unless you already have Fedora and install it as a normal package). In it's current form it already downloads checksum files from the Fedora master mirror via https and uses that to check downloads, but more can be done.